Using Total Shots Ratio to Predict the Premier League

Predicting football is at the same time virtually impossible and rather simple. For example, we can be fairly confident in predicting the teams that will be challenging for the title next season and which clubs are likely to be involved in the relegation dogfight. However, is there a measure that might give us a bit more objective predictive power to determine what might happen over the course of a season?

The excellent football analytics blog by James Grayson has looked at a measure called Total Shots Ratio (TSR). This is a fairly simple measure that looks at the ratio of the total shots in a match that each side has. In other words, the formula for it would be:

Total Shots Ratio = Total Shots For / (Total Shots For + Total Shots Against)

Applying this to the 2012/13 Premier League season that has recently ended, we can calculate the TSR for each club. To see whether there is any correlation between this value and the club’s final position in the table, we can plot TSR against points for each club.

Clearly, we can see that there is a reasonable correlation between the two. Indeed, the R² value for the line of best fit in this chart is 0.582.

There are a couple of interesting anomalies in the data that are worth looking briefly at. Manchester United acquired a significantly higher number of points than the best-fit line suggested that they should. Their TSR of just 0.534 suggests that they should have collected 57 points, as opposed to the 89 that they did achieve. Similarly, QPR’s TSR of 0.459 should have returned them 45 points and comfortably kept them in the top division.

The clear flaw in this measure is the lack of any indication of the quality of the shot. A team could have 25 of the 30 shots in a match, but if all of their shots are from 30 yards while their opponent’s 5 shots are all from inside the six yard box, the TSR would not be a particularly great indicator for that match.

So, we could hypothesise that Manchester United may have not created as many chances as we might have expected relative to their opponents, but the quality of their shots were superior. Indeed, we find that Manchester United’s 37.9% of shots on target was the highest in the Premier League, which combined with the quality of their strikers might explain their TSR. Similarly, QPR’s 29.2% shots on target was the lowest in the Premier League – in other words, they may have taken plenty of shots, but not many of them hit the target.

It is worth looking at this over a longer period. With just 20 data points for the 2012/13 season, we cannot be confident that these results are necessarily correct. Having collected TSR data for the past eight seasons, back until the 2005/06 season, this could be plotted this against the total points.

We can clearly see a solid positive correlation between TSR and points, as shown by the R² value. In the graph, the red data points indicate the team that won the title that season, the yellow points are those teams that qualified for the Champions League, while those in black are those teams that were relegated.

We can make a few observations from this. No team that has won the title has found themselves below the line of best fit for this data. While no champion has been quite as extreme as Manchester United this season, they all find themselves with a better than average TSR with respect to the number of points that they obtained. Similarly, albeit with a couple of exceptions, all the relegated clubs have been below the line.

This seems to suggest that while having a good TSR is certainly important, simply having a large number of shots without taking into account the quality of the shot is not enough. Teams can also improve their TSR in two ways – either by increasing the number of shots that they have or by restricting their opponents to a lower number of shots.

In the future, it will be interesting to look to incorporate a measure of quality of shot into this and see if we can use that to try and explain some more of the variation that we see in the data. However, we can see that TSR does provide a reasonable good predictor of a team’s performance over the course of a whole season.

Ajax and de Boer: Maximising Their Late Season Advantage

When reading an excellent article concerning Frank de Boer at Ajax, there was one particular paragraph that I found particularly interesting:

"His players towards the end of the season are just as fit as they were at the start, albeit covering more ground, circulating the ball at a rapid rate. This is largely down to a training program designed to have them at their optimum best in the final months... This method coupled with the slow progress of re-building after losing key personnel in the summer, plus a young squad playing three games in a week, has unsurprisingly impacted on their form between August and December."

As a long season progresses, many teams find that they begin to drop away - the good form of the early months of the season a distant memory. We can think of countless examples of teams collapsing in the closing stretch of a season, missing out on European qualification or plummeting into the relegation dogfight. Aston Villa under Martin O'Neill were an excellent example. Playing with such a small core of players, fatigue and injuries took their toll - in his four years at Villa, he won just one game in March. Each year, this poor run late in the season cost the club a potential Champions League challenge.

Far fewer are the examples of teams finishing the season more strongly than they began. However, under Frank de Boer, Ajax have been a remarkable example. He joined the club as manager in December 2010 following the resignation of his predecessor, Martin Jol. Over the course of his nearly three seasons at the club, we can compare Ajax's record between the start of the season and the 28th February, and the 1st March until the end of the season:

2012/13 Season

Pre-March

Played 24, Won 13, Drawn 9, Lost 2, Goals Scored 54, Goals Conceded 25, Points 48

Goals Scored per game – 2.25

Goals Conceded per game – 1.04

Points per game – 2.00

March Onwards

Played 10, Won 9, Drawn 1, Lost 0, Goals Scored 29, Goals Conceded 6, Points 28

Goals Scored per game – 2.90

Goals Conceded per game – 0.60

Points per game – 2.80

2011/12 Season

Pre-March

Played 23, Won 12, Drawn 7, Lost 4, Goals Scored 59, Goals Conceded 32, Points 43

Goals Scored per game – 2.57

Goals Conceded per game – 1.39

Points per game – 1.87

March Onwards

Played 11, Won 11, Drawn 0, Lost 0, Goals Scored 34, Goals Conceded 4, Points 33

Goals Scored per game – 3.09

Goals Conceded per game – 1.36

Points per game – 3.00

2010/11 Season

Pre-March

Played 25, Won 14, Drawn 7, Lost 4, Goals Scored 47, Goals Conceded 22, Points 49

Goals Scored per game – 1.88

Goals Conceded per game – 0.88

Points per game – 1.96

March Onwards

Played 9, Won 8, Drawn 0, Lost 1, Goals Scored 25, Goals Conceded 8, Points 24

Goals Scored per game – 2.78

Goals Conceded per game – 0.89

Points per game – 2.67

Each season, we can see the improvement in the team's performance entering the closing months of the season. In his first season, the goals conceded per game remained constant, while they scored an additional 0.90 goals per game, increasing the average points per game from 1.96 to 2.67. In each of the past two seasons, they have conceded fewer goals and scored more goals in each game in the period from March onwards.

Indeed, since Frank de Boer took over, his record in the period from the start of March until the end of the season reads:

Played 30, Won 28, Drawn 1, Lost 1, Goals Scored 88, Goals Conceded 18, Points 85

It is these repeated strong finishes that have taken Ajax to three straight titles under the stewardship of Frank de Boer. It also raises the interesting question of whether his training regime, based around bringing his players to peak condition around the start of March, is an ideal plan.

At the end of the season, other teams are beginning to tire, have little to play for and find that niggling injuries are beginning to take their toll. Arguably, it means that a team in peak physical condition should have a greater advantage in each match at this stage of the season than in the respective match played at the start of the season. In other words, they should have a significantly higher points expectation for the match played in mid-March than if the same match were played in mid-October.

In the modern day, a club such as Ajax are strongly built around either producing quality youth graduates or bringing in young players, all of which can then potentially be sold for a profit. Each summer, Frank de Boer and Ajax would be expecting to lose their better players. This can be seen clearly in the list of players that have departed the club over the past three years - Luis Suarez (£23.3m), Maarten Stekelenburg (£5.5m), Danny de Zeeuw (£5.5m), Jan Vertonghen (£11m), Gregory van der Wiel (£5.25m) and Vurnon Anita (£7.5m). Indeed, over the past three season, Ajax have a net spend of -£44m.

This is a pattern that is expected to repeat itself this summer. Christian Eriksson, signed for just under £900k, has been strongly linked with Borussia Dortmund, while academy product, Toby Alderweireld has been linked with Liverpool and Manchester United. 

This constant loss of their leading players each summer means that it takes the team a while to overcome these setbacks and for their replacements to gel into the lineup. It takes time for the new players to adapt to how Frank de Boer wants his team to play, but once they are settled and the team reaches its physical peak, they become virtually unstoppable.

Were they to reach peak physical condition in the early part of the season, the gains from this would be offset somewhat by the negative aspects of the lack of cohesiveness among the squad. Instead, by peaking later in the season, they are able to utilise this physical advantage to its maximum.

Their late season form stands in stark contrast to their closest rivals, PSV Eindhoven. In each of the last three seasons, PSV have scored fewer goals per game, conceded more goals per game and accrued fewer points per game in the period from March onwards than in the earlier part of the season. Ajax know that as long as they are able to remain within touching distance of PSV through the Christmas period and into the new year, they have an excellent chance to win the title.

In each of the last three seasons, PSV have been ahead of Ajax on the final day of Feburary, having held a two point advantage this season, and a five point advantage in the previous two seasons. Each time, Ajax have finished the season strongly and have overtaken their rivals.

The ability to finish the season strongly is an excellent attribute for a team to possess. Not only does it bring plenty of points, but it also puts added pressure onto rival teams. Knowing that your rival is likely to pick up close to maximum points means that you know that any dropped points could be crucial. Under such pressure, many teams can choke.

This emphasis by Frank de Boer on targeting the last ten games of the season is a very smart tactic. It has already brought them three consecutive titles, despite the repeated loss of their leading players. He has proven himself to be a very smart and capable manager and it would be no surprise to see him being linked with some of the bigger jobs in Europe in the near future.

WTA Rome Final Preview - Serena Williams v Victoria Azarenka

With Serena Williams currently on the longest winning run of her remarkable career, many people are beginning to wonder if anyone can beat her. Since losing in Doha, she has embarked on a run of 23 consecutive victories, winning titles in Miami, Charleston and Madrid. She has lost just four sets in that run.

However, tomorrow she comes up against the last player to beat her - Victoria Azarenka. The reigning Australian Open champion last week saw her unbeaten start to the year brought to a crashing end as she lost in three bad-tempered sets to Ekaterina Makarova, but this week has seen her reach another final, and another meeting with Serena Williams.

Their last meeting in Doha saw Azarenka snap a nine-match losing streak against the American as she won a high-quality match 6-3 in the third set. It provided the opportunity for Azarenka to atone for her defeat in last year's US Open final, where she served for the title before going down 7-5 in the final set.

Serena, though, is in sparkling form on the clay right now. Last week in Madrid, she clinched her first title on red clay in almost a decade and she has brought that form to Rome. Promising teenager, Laura Robson, was dispatched in the second round with a solid 13/11 W/UE ratio. In the quarter-final, Dominika Cibulkova, was blasted off the court in a hail of winners. 40 winners flew off the racket of Serena Williams in just 13 games, while she hit just 16 unforced errors.

The tricky Carla Suarez Navarro was the next victim of Serena as she took her total winners for the tournament to 79 compared to just 41 unforced errors. The semi-final started competitively as Simona Halep took an early lead, but once Serena was settled, there was only one winner. From *2-1 up, Halep would win just one more game in the match. 24 winners would take Serena past the 100 mark for the tournament.

Azarenka came past the potentially tricky Julia Goerges in the second round for the loss of just two games, before Ayumi Morita retired at 6-1, 2-0 down. Her quarter-final meeting against Sam Stosur was far more difficult. She struggled on serve, particularly behind her second serve, winning just 50% of points on serve and 41% on second serve. Just as worrying would have been the 34 unforced errors compared with just 14 winners.

However, come the semi-final against the dangerous Sara Errani, those problems seemed to be a thing of the past. In a blistering start, she hammered 10 winners and just 3 unforced errors to race into a 4-0 lead when the rain delayed play. The break was not to prove an issue as she closed out the bagel. While the second set was more competitive, Azarenka stayed solid to come through 6-0, 7-5. Her statistics of 37 winners to 22 unforced errors will be far more pleasing and reflects what she needs to do against Serena.

The key tomorrow will be the respective serves. Azarenka has often struggled to deal with Serena's first serve, just as so many players have in the past. In all their six meetings last year, Serena won over 75% of points behind the first serve. However, in their meeting in Doha earlier this year, this figure dropped below 70%. In the majority of their meetings last year, Azarenka was able to win over 50% of points on Serena's second serve, particularly by being aggressive with the return. If she is able to win a few extra points on the first serve, she will give herself a chance to reach break point.

However, she also needs to serve well herself. The key will be to get plenty of 1st serves into play, otherwise Serena will do to her second serve what she does to Serena's. She served at a solid 80% today against Sara Errani, winning 65% behind that first serve and she will need figures around those marks to beat Serena tomorrow.

While Serena will start the match as the overwhelming favourite, Victoria Azarenka is the only player that has beaten a fully fit Serena since Cincinnati last year. She almost beat her in Flushing Meadows and the win in Doha will have given her the confidence that she can live with Serena. Whether she can do it on clay is a different matter, but it should be an interesting final.

UEFA Financial Fair Play Rules Face Legal Challenge

The implementation of new rules that introduce barriers to entry and entrench existing disparities in an industry would normally be frowned upon, particularly when those rules are being introduced by an association that governs a large swathe of that industry. UEFA’s new Financial Fair Play (FFP) rules appear to do exactly this though, and it is no surprise to see the first major legal challenge to these regulations.

UEFA's FFP is one of Michel Platini's crowning achievements,
but it could face an uncertain legal future

What is FFP?

Firstly, we shall look at what exactly FFP rules are and the purpose that they are meant to serve. There were six primary objectives that were set out when UEFA announced the framework for FFP:

•          To encourage responsible spending for the long-term benefit of football
•          To improve the economic and financial capability of the clubs
•          To ensure that clubs settle their liabilities with players, tax authorities and other clubs punctually
•          To encourage clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues
•          To introduce more rationality and discipline in club football finance
•          To protect the long-term viability and sustainability of European club football

These objectives were set out to try and put the brakes on costs and losses in football from spiralling out of control. Many clubs are currently underwritten by wealthy, often overseas, investors, while others have gambled the club’s future by operating above their means in the hopes of achieving increased future revenues. This has led to a number of high-profile collapses over the past decade, not just in the UK.

The general objective behind FFP is to ensure that clubs balance their books over a specified period of time. Varying aspects of it have also been separated adopted by leagues around Europe – the Premier League recently announced a limit on the increase of wage bills from season to season, while the Championship and Leagues 1 and 2 all have variant on UEFA’s break-even approach.

What are Striani’s grievances?

On the face of it, the aims and objectives of FFP seem very reasonable and the clubs themselves have agreed to abide by these rules. However, Belgian agent, Daniel Striani, with the backing of Bosman lawyer, Jean-Louis Dupont, has now launched a legal challenge to FFP on the basis that it contains anti-competitive measures and will impact on his ability to generate income due to reduced transfers between clubs.

The three main arguments that Striani and Dupont will employ are that FFP will restrict outside investment in football clubs, FFP will entrench the existing disparities within the market and that FFP will reduce the transfer market and salary packages, thus affecting Striani’s ability to generate income for his business.

Does the challenge have a chance?

One major question that must be discussed is how the European Union views sporting industries. An EU white paper on sport mentions that “the Commission acknowledged the usefulness of robust licensing systems as a tool for promoting good governance in sport.” On the face of it, that would suggest that there are no issues with FFP. However, it goes on to clarify that “such systems must be compatible with competition and internal market provisions and may not go beyond what is necessary for the pursuit of a legitimate objective relating to the proper organisation and conduct of sport.”

It is in this clarification where the issues may potentially lie. Sport is very different to other industries in that one of the key elements of sport is uncertainty. Unlike other industries, there is a strong interest on the part of clubs to ensure a degree of competitive balance within competitions and leagues.

So, the question really arises as to whether FFP is compatible with existing EU competition policy and whether it goes beyond what is necessary.

In an opinion piece in the New York Times, Dupont argues that FFP would struggle to meet existing EU law - “as an agreement whereby industry participants jointly decide to limit investments, FFP likely constitutes collusion and hence a violation of EU competition law.” The European Commission views this differently as EU competition chief, Joaquin Almunia, has already written to Michel Platini explaining his view that FFP is “consistent with the aims and objectives of EU policy.”

A former case, that of Meca-Medina in 2006, has set the precedent that sporting rules do not constitute a special case. They must be fully consistent with existing EU regulations. In other words, the European Court of Justice must apply the same tests to sporting rules as they would apply to rules in any other area of economic activity.

FFP will almost certainly distort competition and inter-community trade. It will almost certainly have an impact on the transfer market, both internally within countries and between EU member states. They will reduce both the size of transfer fees and the quantity of transfers between clubs. It will also limit investment from outside third-parties. It could be argued that this could entrench the existing elite at the top by limiting the ability of other clubs to break into this group.

Chelsea and Manchester City are the obvious two examples that have benefitted from outside investment, from Roman Abramovich and Sheikh Mansour respectively, to break into the elite group. Without this third party investment, it is very difficult to see a scenario where these two clubs could have achieved the position in which they now find themselves.

Dupont explains that “the break-even rule makes no allowance for the commercial disparities between individual national leagues, which means that smaller clubs are hit harder, proportionately, than larger ones. Without the ability to invest in their longer-term success, smaller clubs will stay small. This is clearly anticompetitive.”

So, the fact that it likely infringes upon competition policy is fairly clear. The real question is whether it goes beyond what is necessary to achieve its objectives – in other words, are there other regulations that could be implemented instead to achieve the same objectives, but that are less restrictive on clubs?

There is an argument that the existing regulations achieve the stated objectives. Clubs are required to meet certain specifications to receive a license from UEFA, including demonstrating that there are no overdue payments to other clubs, employees or tax authorities. It could be argued that there is no need to restrict how clubs spend their money, or how they utilise debt, provided that they can meet their obligations through their existing resources.

Striani and Dupont will argue that there are other, less restrictive, ways to achieve the stated objectives. Improved revenue-sharing and a ‘luxury tax’, as employed in the NBA, has been mentioned as an alternative.

It will be a nervous time for UEFA. They have already had to remove a transfer ban as one of the punishments for breaking FFP due to concerns over it being unenforceable in court. Now they face the real threat that the entire FFP framework could be picked apart in the European courts.

Giro d'Italia Stage 12 Preview

After Tuesday's brutal stage, it was a far quieter stage today with the breakaway eventually claiming the stage win through Garmin's Ramunas Navardauskas. We mentioned him in the preview as a likely contender for the breakaway, but not for the actual stage win itself.

Stage 12 should be a rare one for the sprinters and I would expect to see the likes of Omega Pharma Quickstep and Cannondale on the front of the peloton to ensure that their men have the opportunity to compete for the stage win.

Both Mark Cavendish and Elia Viviani have their eyes on the red jersey. Cavendish will take the jersey back off Cadel Evans should he win tomorrow, while Viviani has a chance to go back into the top 3 in the points competition. They are likely to be the two to beat.

With John Degenkolb's retirement from the race, the biggest threat is likely to come from Nacer Bouhanni. FDJ struggled with their lead-out train in the last sprint stage, but the Frenchman was almost able to come through and pip Cavendish on the line. I would expect them to get it right tomorrow, so Bouhanni will be a real threat.

Other than that, it is tough to see the likes of Matt Goss, Roberto Ferrari or Giacomo Nizzolo really challenging these three. It would be a real surprise to see anyone else up on the top spot of the podium, or even really on the lower steps of the podium.

Prediction

1. Cavendish
2. Bouhanni
3. Viviani
4. Goss
5. Mezgec

Recommended Bets

Mark Cavendish @ 8/11
Nacer Bouhanni E/W @ 10/1

The Role of Luck in the Premier League

How many times have we watched the ball hit the inside of the post and stay out? How many times has the bounce of the ball just taken it inches out of the reach of the striker? How many times has an opposition's shot taken a deflection and flown into the back of the net?

With football being such a low-scoring sport, luck plays a crucial role. The Premier League averages 2.77 goals per game, which is slightly above the general world average. However, with so few scoring plays, the importance of a single goal is high. Many goals or scoring opportunities involve luck in some form or another.

Luck in football can play a huge role. 

However, is there a way that we can measure the impact that luck can have on how a team performs over a season compared with the general talent in a team?

I was reading 'The Book: Playing the Percentages in Baseball' by Tom Tango and came across a formula that he uses to answer such a question. He hypothesises that overall talent can be estimated from the overall variance in a league, where:

Total Variance = Variance due to talent + variance due to luck

To calculate total variance, we will look at win percentages and calculate the variance over the 20 teams in the league. To calculate the variance due to luck, Tango suggests that we can use the following formula:

Standard Deviation due to Luck = √(0.5*(0.5/Number of Matches Played)

However, the first issue to tackle is that of draws. Tango used his formula in baseball, where there are only two possible outcomes - win or lose. Obviously, in football, the draw is a common result, occurring in slightly over 25% of matches, so we cannot simply ignore them.

A commonly used alternative is to consider a draw as half a victory and half a loss. While this is not the worst method, it does ignore the fact that a team gains three points for a victory and just one for a draw. Therefore, it seems logical to consider a draw as a third of a victory and two thirds of a loss. As a result, we can then use this to scale up to actual points later, rather than just win percentages.

So, now we have our method set out, it is time to look at the results. In the current season, the average win percentage in the Premier League is 45.27%. If we multiply this by the 37 games that every team has played, it gives us a value for the average number of wins in the Premier League - 16.75. Remembering that each win is worth 3 points, we find that the average number of points in the Premier League is 50.25.

The variance of the winning percentages across the division is calculated to be 0.0247. We can also calculate the standard deviation due to luck, which comes out at 0.0822, which, when squared, gives an variance due to luck of 0.00676. In other words, the proportion of the total variance that can be explained by luck is 27.4%.

While it is encouraging that 72.6% of variance in the Premier League is determined by the talent of the players in each squad, the luck factor can still play a huge role. As we found earlier, the average number of points is 50.25. Given the variance due to luck, this would suggest that the average team would expect to gain points in the range from 37-64.

The difference between 37 points and 64 points is huge in the Premier League. A total of 37 points in the current season would put the team in 17th position, just two points clear of Wigan in the relegation zone going into the final day of the season. Conversely, 64 points would place the team in 6th position above Everton and, although not this season given the cup winners, would usually be good enough for a Europa League place.

We often see teams over-performing in one season before seemingly under-performing in the following season, raising the questions whether they were really as good as they were in one season, or as bad as they were in the other.

Newcastle are the prime example - last season, they had a wonderful season, finishing 5th and just missing out on the Champions League, while this season, they only secured their survival last weekend after a 2-1 win at QPR. They were fortunate to accrue as many points as they did last season, while arguably they have been unfortunate this season.

Interestingly, they collected 65 points last season, which puts them at the very top end of what we would expect from the average team, while their 41 points this season is only just above the bottom end of what we expect to see. Given many people would argue that Newcastle would be very close to the average, middle of the road Premier League team, their two seasons can be viewed as perfectly demonstrating the impact of luck and the natural variance of points around the expected mean.

Giro d'Italia Stage 11 Preview

For almost the first time in the race, the stage panned out precisely as we expected. An early breakaway group that was reeled in, an attack from Franco Pellizotti on his local slopes, and the smaller climbers pulling away from Wiggins and Gesink on the steepest sections of the climb.

After the brutal climbs today, stage 11 would appear to be suited to a breakaway success, although if Team Sky look to set a pace as they did today, then it could come down to a select group on the final climb. The next two stages are designed for the sprinters, so the GC contenders could look to give it one final attack before two gentle days to recover.

The battle for the mountain jersey should recommence with the category 2 climb of Sella Ciampigotto. Both Stefano Pirazzi and Robinson Chalapud were quiet today, but I would expect both of them to be in the break and competing for maximum points on the peak. Vini Fantini will likely look to put a rider in the break as well. The likes of Danilo Di Luca, Matteo Rabbotini and Stefano Garzelli are all far enough down in the GC that they will be allowed to go up the road. It is tough to decide which might be the one that goes - it could simply come down to whoever feels best in the morning.

Cadel Evans could look to steal bonus seconds by winning
a sprint between the leading contenders

The biggest shock in today's stage was that the defending champion, Ryder Hesjedal, cracked on the first climb and is now over 23 minutes back with his hopes of retaining his title in tatters. With that out of the question, Garmin may now look to go for stage wins, so it would be no surprise to see one of their riders up the front - Ramunas Navardauskas or even Hesjedal himself would appear to be the main candidates.

However, having seen how Team Sky pushed the pace on the climbs today, they could well look to do the same tomorrow and go for the bonus seconds available. With both Uran and Wiggins in the top 3, they have options and we could see either going for stage victory. Whether they could create any gaps remains to be seen, but the bonus seconds could be crucial in narrowing the gap to Nibali and Evans. In this scenario though, Cadel Evans would certainly be one to watch. Also targeting bonus seconds, he has shown his ability in the sprints against the other favourites and cannot be ruled out.

Two other riders to watch out for are Carlos Betancur and Enrico Battaglin. With back-to-back 2nd place finishes, Betancur has shown that he can attack and he will be desperate for that elusive stage win. While the finish is not the steepest, if he attacks, he has shown that he is tough to catch if he gets a gap. Similarly, Battaglin has shown that he can hang in on the less challenging climbs and he is very quick at the finish if he can make it there with the front group.

Prediction

1. Evans
2. Wiggins
3. Betancur
4. Nibali
5. Uran

Recommended Bets

Cadel Evans @ 12/1
Enrico Battaglin @ 33/1
Bradley Wiggins @ 50/1